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1091 
CLARIFYING WASHINGTON’S APPROACH TO THE 




Abstract: When faced with limited or no recovery under contract law, resourceful lawyers 
often turn to tort law. The economic loss rule restricts this practice by barring recovery in tort 
for solely economic losses. However, what qualifies as “economic loss” is not always clear. In 
2010, the Washington State Supreme Court announced it was clarifying the economic loss rule 
by adopting the independent duty doctrine.
1
 Rather than analyze the type of loss suffered, the 
independent duty doctrine determines whether a party owed a tort duty independent of the 
relevant contract, closely mirroring a traditional tort inquiry. When establishing the 
independent duty doctrine, the court left intact cases decided under the economic loss rule and 
the rule’s general role as “the boundary between torts and contract [law].”
2
 
However, the very nature of these two rules conflict. Upholding both rules has led to 
bitterly split opinions from the Washington State Supreme Court and confusion among litigants 
and other courts. This Comment argues that the court’s construction of the independent duty 
doctrine generally, and its decision to maintain the economic loss rule’s theory and 
jurisprudence, has resulted in misapplication of the independent duty doctrine by litigants and 
within other courts. It proposes that the Washington State Supreme Court clarify the doctrine 
by abrogating the state’s economic loss rule jurisprudence and re-framing the independent duty 
doctrine analysis around when tort duties can be assumed in a contract. 
INTRODUCTION 
When faced with limited or no recovery under contract law, resourceful 
lawyers frequently turn to tort law. Historically, the Washington State 
Supreme Court has applied the economic loss rule to limit this practice.
3
 
The economic loss rule prohibits tort actions for purely economic losses.
4
 
“Economic loss” is a conceptual device used to classify damages, which 
are generally defined as losses other than those resulting from personal 
injury or property damage.
5
 However, making these determinations, and 
                                                   
*
J.D. Candidate, University of Washington School of Law, Class of 2020. Special thanks to 
Professor Hugh Spitzer for his guidance, comments, and insightful edits throughout the drafting 
process. I would also like to thank the entire Washington Law Review editorial staff for your 
invaluable assistance, especially Rachael Clark and Ria Kuruvilla. 
1. Eastwood v. Horse Harbor Found., Inc., 170 Wash. 2d 380, 388, 241 P.3d 1256, 1261 (2010). 
2. Id. at 416, 241 P.3d at 1275. 
3. Elcon Constr., Inc. v. E. Wash. Univ., 174 Wash. 2d 157, 165, 273 P.3d 965, 969 (2012) (quoting 
Eastwood, 170 Wash. 2d at 416, 241 P.3d at 1275 (Chambers, J., concurring)). 
4. Berschauer/Phillips Constr. Co. v. Seattle Sch. Dist., 124 Wash. 2d 816, 833, 881 P.2d 986, 
996  (1994). 
5. See Miller v. U.S. Steel Corp., 902 F.2d 573, 574 (7th Cir. 1990) (discussing how, as Judge 
Posner has explained, the term “economic loss” is a misnomer: “It would be better to call it a 
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In 2010, the Washington State Supreme Court announced it was 
clarifying the economic loss rule by adopting the independent duty 
doctrine.
7
 Unlike the economic loss rule, which analyzes the type of loss 
suffered, the independent duty doctrine determines whether the party 
owed a duty independent of the contract.
8
 Despite this change, the court 
left intact the economic loss rule and its caselaw.
9
 
In adopting the independent duty doctrine, the Washington State 
Supreme Court attempted to alleviate confusion by abandoning the 
economic loss rule’s focus on the type of loss suffered.
10
 Instead, the 
independent duty doctrine asks, “whether the injury is traceable [] to a 
breach of a tort law duty of care arising independently of the contract.”
11
 
In practice, the independent duty doctrine inquiry essentially mirrors 
Washington State’s traditional tort analysis, which determines whether a 
tort duty is owed and when liability attaches regardless of a contract.
12
 
The independent duty doctrine’s traditional tort inquiry naturally 
opposes the economic loss rule’s focus on contract remedies—resulting 
in confusion.
13
 For example, the economic loss rule “defaults to contract 
remedies where both [tort and contract remedies] are available,”
14
 while 
the independent duty doctrine “defaults to tort remedies” and bars tort 
remedies in only a narrow set of circumstances.
15
 Thus, by leaving intact 
the economic loss rule’s jurisprudence, the Washington State Supreme 
                                                   
‘commercial loss,’ . . . because personal injuries and especially property losses are economic losses, 
too—they destroy values which can be and are monetized. . . .”); Wash. Water Power Co. v. Graybar 
Elec. Co., 112 Wash. 2d 847, 861 n.10, 774 P.2d 1199, 1208 n.10 (1989). 
6. R. Joseph Barton, Drowning in a Sea of Contract: Application of the Economic Loss Rule to 
Fraud and Negligent Misrepresentation Claims, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1789, 1789 (2000). 
7. Eastwood, 170 Wash. 2d at 398, 241 P.3d at 1266.  
8. Id. 
9. See Affiliated FM Ins. Co. v. LTK Consulting Servs., Inc., 170 Wash. 2d 442, 450, 243 P.3d 
521, 526 n.3 (2010) (“Our decisions in this case and in Eastwood leave intact our prior cases where 
we have held a tort remedy is not available in a specific set of circumstances.”). This assertion was 
made by a lead opinion that garnered a majority of the votes in result only. Id. However, later 
independent duty doctrine cases and opinions accept this assertion as a holding and treat it as part of 
the doctrine. See, e.g., Donatelli v. D.R. Strong Consulting Eng’rs, Inc., 179 Wash. 2d 84, 104, 312 
P.3d 620, 630 (2013) (Madsen, J., dissenting) (finding economic loss rule cases undisturbed under 
the new doctrine per the majority’s direction in Affiliated FM). 
10. Eastwood, 170 Wash. 2d at 387–88, 241 P.3d at 1261.  
11. Id. at 394, 241 P.3d at 1264. 
12. Id. at 406, 241 P.3d at 1270 (Madsen, J., concurring). 
13. See Elcon Constr., Inc. v. E. Wash. Univ., 174 Wash. 2d 157, 175, 273 P.3d 965, 974 (2012) 
(Madsen, J., concurring). 
14. Id. at 172, 273 P.3d at 973. 
15. Id.  
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Court asked courts to maintain inherently opposite principles in their 
application of the new doctrine. Consequently, litigants
16
 and other 
courts
17
 have struggled to apply and interpret the independent 
duty  doctrine. 
This Comment argues that the maintenance of the economic loss rule, 
in the face of the introduction of the independent duty doctrine, fuels 
rather than alleviates confusion in Washington State. Part I provides a 
descriptive background of the economic loss rule and the development of 
the independent duty doctrine in Washington State. Part II introduces key 
cases that have applied the independent duty doctrine and uses the tort of 
negligent misrepresentation to illustrate how the doctrines handle 
situations of overlapping contract and tort law. Part III details the 
challenges litigants and courts have faced when applying the independent 
duty doctrine. Part IV argues that rather than continuing to balance these 
two distinct rules, the Washington State Supreme Court should formally 
discontinue the economic loss rule and its jurisprudence and reframe the 
independent duty doctrine’s analysis around when a tort duty can be 
assumed within a contract. 
I.  THE WASHINGTON STATE SUPREME COURT DEVELOPED 
THE INDEPENDENT DUTY DOCTRINE TO CLARIFY THE 
ECONOMIC LOSS RULE 
A. The Economic Loss Rule was Intended to Define the Boundary 
Between Contract Law and Tort Law 
The origins of the economic loss rule date back to the nineteenth 
century.
18
 Historically, when injured plaintiffs have been unable to 
recover in contract due to issues such as “lack of privity, [or the] 
                                                   
16. See, e.g., Reading Hosp. v. Anglepoint Grp., Inc., No. C15-0251-JCC, 2015 WL 13145347, 
at  *3 n.1 (W.D. Wash. May 26, 2015) (finding Microsoft’s counsel’s attempts to apply economic 
loss rule reasoning and “misreads” of the Washington State Supreme Court’s independent duty 
doctrine as allowing tort remedies in circumstances where it actually limits tort remedies). 
17. See Pac. Boring, Inc. v. Staheli Trenchless Consultants, Inc., 138 F. Supp. 3d 1156, 1167 (W.D. 
Wash. 2015), aff’d, 708 F. App’x 324 (9th Cir. 2017) (barring a tort claim under the independent duty 
doctrine while citing cases and analysis under the economic loss regime). 
18. See Sidney R. Barrett, Jr., Recovery of Economic Loss in Tort for Construction Defects: A 
Critical Analysis, 40 S.C. L. REV. 891, 897–98 (1989) (providing an in-depth discussion of the history 
of the economic loss rule). Some commentators have incorrectly suggested the economic loss rule 
emerged during the rise of products liability. See, e.g., Benjamin J. McDonnell, Finding a Contract 
in the “Muddle”: Tracing the Source of Design Professionals’ Liability in the Construction Context 
Under Washington’s Independent Duty Doctrine, 48 GONZ. L. REV. 627, 632 (2012) (“The 
development of the economic loss rule begins with product liability law.”); Barton, supra note 6, at 
1794 (“The economic loss rule is a judicially created doctrine, first articulated by the California 
Supreme Court in Seely v. White Motor Co.”). 
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unavailability of punitive damages . . . resourceful lawyers have sought to 
recover in tort.”
19
 In an attempt to limit this practice and prevent tort law 




Products liability law played a central role in the development of 
economic loss rule jurisprudence.
21
 In Washington State, early products 
liability cases established the economic loss rule’s emphasis on the type 
of harm suffered.
22
 This line of cases distinguished “economic loss from 
physical harm or property damage.”
23
 Washington courts subsequently 
applied this distinction to other contexts and extended the economic loss 
rule beyond products liability, denying tort claims for economic losses in 
construction and real property.
24
 The public policy concept of protecting 




Protecting contract law from the encroachment of tort law drove the 
development of the economic loss rule.
26
 The rule restricts parties to 
contract remedies in cases where, because of the nature of their damages, 
the existing contract provides the “proper” remedy.
27
 This is because “tort 
law is not intended to compensate parties for losses suffered as a result of 
a breach of duties assumed only by agreement.”
28
 Rather, it concerns 
“obligations imposed by law, rather than by bargain.”
29
 
Tort law is meant to protect members of society from damaging 
behaviors by others and to encourage products that are safe, or at least not 
“unreasonably” dangerous to the public.
30
 As a social policy, tort law 
promotes the efficient allocation of resources by creating incentives for 
                                                   
19. Barrett, supra note 18, at 898. 
20. See Jeffrey L. Goodman et al., A Guide to Understanding the Economic Loss Doctrine, 67 
DRAKE L. REV. 1, 4 n.14 (2019) (“It is clear, however, that if this development were allowed to 
progress too far, contract law would drown in a sea of tort.” (quoting E. River S.S. Corp. v. 
Transamerica Deleval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 866 (1986))). 
21. See Barrett, supra note 18, at 911. 
22. See, e.g., Stuart v. Coldwell Banker Commercial Grp., Inc., 109 Wash. 2d 406, 420, 745 P.2d 
1284, 1291 (1987).  
23. Id.  
24. See Alejandre v. Bull, 159 Wash. 2d 674, 687, 153 P.3d 864, 870 (2007) (detailing the 
development of the economic loss rule in Washington State); McDonnell, supra note 18. 
25. Eastwood v. Horse Harbor Found., Inc., 170 Wash. 2d 380, 407–08, 241 P.3d 1256, 1271 
(2010) (Alexander, J. & Chambers, J., concurring). 
26. Jackowski v. Borchelt, 174 Wash. 2d 720, 730, 278 P.3d 1100, 1105 (2012). 
27. Alejandre, 159 Wash. 2d at 681–82, 153 P.3d at 867–68 (citing Berschauer/Phillips Constr. Co. 
v. Seattle Sch. Dist., 124 Wash. 2d 816, 822, 881 P.2d 986, 990 (1994)). 
28. Id. at 682, 153 P.3d at 868 (quoting Duquesne Light Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 66 F.3d 
604, 618 (3d Cir. 1995)). 
29. Stuart v. Coldwell Banker Commercial Grp., Inc., 109 Wash. 2d 406, 420, 745 P.2d 1284, 1291 (1987). 
30. Id. 
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people and companies to take cost-justified precautions.
31
 Generally, tort 
law’s goal is to restore the plaintiff to the position they were in prior to 
the defendant’s harmful conduct.
32
 “[T]ort duties arise to protect 
individuals unable to protect themselves from the unscrupulous actions of 
others and irrespective of the existence of a contract.”
33
 
In contrast, contract law protects “society’s interest in [the] 
performance of promises.”
34
 It provides a set of rules to govern bargains 
between private individuals. 
35
 Contract law remedies protect the parties’ 
expectation interests by returning the injured party to the economic 
position they
36
 would have been in had the other party properly performed 
the bargained for promise.
37
 
The economic loss rule was meant to be a bright-line rule to maintain 
the separate purposes of tort and contract law.
38
 Contract law encourages 
parties to bargain for their own distribution of risk.
39
 By limiting the 
availability of tort remedies, the economic loss rule is supposed to protect 
the integrity of the bargaining process.
40
 It is also meant to assure 
contracted parties greater “certainty” and “predictability” by delineating 
the specific risks they assume through agreement.
41
 
The economic loss rule is meant to preserve that certainty.
42
 Tort 
liability is much less predictable than contract liability, and without limits 
like the economic loss rule, it can result in open-ended liability.
43
 It has 
long been suggested that the expansion of tort liability—to include 
economic damages—would expose parties “to a liability in an 
indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate 
                                                   
31. Scott Hershovitz, What Does Tort Law Do? What Can it Do?, 47 VAL. L. REV. 99, 100 (2012). 
32. Alejandre, 159 Wash. 2d at 682, 153 P.3d at 868. 
33. Barton, supra note 6, at 1797. 
34. Alejandre, 159 Wash. 2d at 682, 153 P.3d at 868. 
35. Stuart, 109 Wash. 2d at 420–21, 745 P.2d at 1291–92.  
36. Washington Law Review uses “they” and “their” as a single pronoun to avoid gender-specific language. 
37. Alejandre, 159 Wash. 2d at 682, 153 P.3d at 868 (citing Stuart, 109 Wash. 2d at 420–21, 745 
P.2d at 1291–92). 
38. Berschauer/Phillips Constr. Co. v. Seattle Sch. Dist., 124 Wash. 2d 816, 826, 881 P.2d 986, 
992 (1994). 
39. Alejandre, 159 Wash. 2d at 682, 153 P.3d at 868; see also Daanen & Janssen, Inc. v. 
Cedarapids, Inc., 573 N.W.2d 842 (Wis. 1998).  
40. Berschauer/Phillips, 124 Wash. 2d at 826, 881 P.2d at 992. 
41. Id.  
42. Barton, supra note 6, at 1797; see also Berschauer/Phillips, 124 Wash. 2d at 826, 881 P.2d at 
992 (upholding the economic loss rule “to ensure that the allocation of risk and the determination of 
potential future liability is based on what the parties bargained for in the contract”).  
43. Berschauer/Phillips, 124 Wash. 2d at 826, 881 P.2d at 992; see also Harvey S. Perlman, 
Interference with Contract and Other Economic Expectancies: A Clash of Tort and Contract 
Doctrine, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 61, 71 (1982). 
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 Additionally, the economic loss rule ensures that a party who 
fails to adequately cover their risk in the contract cannot “bring a cause of 
action in tort to recover benefits they were unable to obtain in contractual 
negotiations.”
45
 Given the specific purpose served by contract law, courts 
developed the economic loss rule to preserve contract remedies and 
categorically restrict the availability of tort remedies. 
Every jurisdiction in the United States applies some form of the 
economic loss rule.
46
 The majority of states follow a strict application of 
the economic loss rule, “which prohibits a plaintiff from recovering purely 
economic damages in tort without exception.”
47
 Under this rule, if a 




A minority of states follow what has been described as “the 
intermediate rule.”
49
 The intermediate rule is substantially similar to the 
strict economic loss rule but permits exceptions in a variety of 
circumstances.
50
 The intermediate rule is not uniform; exceptions vary 
across jurisdictions.
51
 There are three main forms of the intermediate rule: 
(1) the dangerous defect exception that “allows recovery of economic 
damages under tort causes of action when a product defect creates an 
unreasonable danger or damages itself in a sudden and unforeseeable 
manner”;
52
 (2) the disappointed expectations test that is similar to the 
dangerous defect exception, but only requires that the damage be 
unforeseeable;
53
 and (3) the independent duty doctrine that requires a duty 
to exist independent of the contract in order for a plaintiff to bring a 
successful tort action.
54
 These three forms of the intermediate rule, and 
the various other less common exceptions, have been criticized for 
complicating the economic loss rule.
55
 Under these exceptions, the 
                                                   
44. Berschauer/Phillips, 124 Wash. 2d at 826, 881 P.2d at 992 (quoting Ultramares Corp. v. 
Touche, Niven & Co., 174 N.E. 441, 444 (N.Y. 1931)). 
45. Id. at 827, 881 P.2d at 992–99; see also Stuart v. Coldwell Banker Commercial Grp., Inc., 109 
Wash. 2d 406, 418, 745 P.2d 1284, 1290 (1987). 
46. Goodman et al., supra note 20, at 7. 
47. Id. at 16. 
48. Id. at 16–17.  
49. Id. at 27 (finding seventeen jurisdictions that follow what they describe as the intermediate rule).  
50. Id. 
51. Id. 
52. Id. at 27–28. 
53. Id. at 29–30. 
54. Id. at 31. 
55. Id. at 56 (citing Lesiak v. Cent. Valley AG Coop., Inc., 808 N.W.2d 67, 80 (Neb. 2012)); see 
also Paul J. Schwiep, The Economic Loss Rule Outbreak: The Monster that Ate Commercial Torts, 
69 FLA. B.J. 34, 34 (1995) (“[J]udges, lawyers, and commercial clients alike are all desperately 
struggling to define the parameters of the economic loss doctrine.”). 
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economic loss rule becomes much more nuanced and can no longer be 
described as a bright-line rule. 
B. By Adopting the Independent Duty Doctrine, the Washington State 
Supreme Court Effectively Overrode the Purpose of the Economic 
Loss Rule 
In November 2010, the Washington State Supreme Court adopted the 
independent duty doctrine.
56
 The independent duty doctrine abandons the 
economic loss rule’s focus on the type of harm suffered and instead asks 
“whether the injury is traceable [] to a breach of a tort law duty of care 
arising independently of the contract.”
57
 
In its initial announcement, the court did not characterize the 
independent duty doctrine as a new rule or even an exception to the 
economic loss rule, but rather as a renaming of the economic loss rule.
58
 
The court’s stated purpose was to orient the economic loss rule away from 
its focus on the type of harm suffered.
59
 This section describes the first 
cases that announced the independent doctrine and details the theoretical 
tensions that immediately surrounded the court’s attempt to apply 
both  rules. 
1. In Eastwood v. Horse Harbor Foundation, Inc., the Court 
Announced the Independent Duty Doctrine and Shifted the Rule’s 
Focus Towards Tort Law 
In Eastwood v. Horse Harbor Foundation, Inc.,60 the Washington State 
Supreme Court announced the independent duty doctrine.
61
 In deciding 
the case, the court was unanimous in result only.
62
 Justice Fairhurst 
authored the lead opinion, signed by two justices; Justices Alexander and 
Chambers co-authored a concurrence, signed by three justices; and Justice 
Madsen authored a concurrence in result only, signed by one justice.
63
 
While distinct, Justice Fairhurst’s lead opinion and Justices Alexander and 
Chambers’s concurrence both supported the announcement of the 
independent duty doctrine and its application in Eastwood.64 They 
                                                   
56. Eastwood v. Horse Harbor Found., Inc., 170 Wash. 2d 380, 398, 241 P.3d 1256, 1266 (2010).  
57. Id. at 394, 241 P.3d at 1264. 
58. Id. at 406, 241 P.3d at 1270 (Alexander, J. & Chambers, J., concurring). 
59. Id. 
60. 170 Wash. 2d 380, 398, 241 P.3d 1256 (2010). 
61. Id. at 398, 241 P.3d at 1256.  
62. Id.  
63. Id.  
64. Id. at 383, 241 P.3d at 1259; id. at 406, 241 P.3d at 1270 (Alexander, J. & Chambers, J., concurring). 
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similarly discussed the doctrine not as a new rule, but as an extension of 
the economic loss rule.
65
 
The facts in Eastwood were as follows. Eastwood owned a horse farm 
in Poulsbo, Washington and Horse Harbor Foundation was a nonprofit 
that cared for “abused and abandoned horses.”
66
 Horse Harbor Foundation 
leased Eastwood’s horse farm property,
67
 but failed to maintain the 
property in a passable condition as required by the parties’ lease 
agreement.
68
 Consequently, Eastwood sued Horse Harbor Foundation for 
breach of lease and the tort of waste.
69
 Horse Harbor Foundation raised 
the economic loss rule as a defense, but the Washington State Court of 
Appeals “[o]n its own motion and without argument” relied on the 
economic loss rule to decide the case.
70
 The Washington State Supreme 




In analyzing whether Eastwood’s recovery was limited by the lease 
agreement, the lead opinion first outlined the failings of the economic loss 
rule, reasoning that any injury can be monetized and categorized as an 
“economic loss.”
72
 Additionally, the court stated that “[t]he term 
‘economic loss rule’ has proved to be a misnomer. It gives the impression 
that . . . any time there is an economic loss, there can never be recovery in 
tort.”
73
 Following this critique, the lead opinion declined to apply the 




Announcing the new doctrine, the court held that “[a]n injury is 
remediable in tort if it traces back to the breach of a tort duty arising 
independently of the terms of the contract.”
75
 Under the independent duty 
doctrine, a plaintiff can recover economic losses in tort, even where there 
is a contract, if the injury resulted from the “breaching [of] an independent 
and concurrent tort duty.”
76
 To determine whether an independent duty 
                                                   
65. Id. at 387–88, 241 P.3d at 1261 (majority opinion); id. at 406, 241 P.3d at 1270 (Alexander, J. 
& Chambers, J., concurring). 
66. Id. at 383, 241 P.3d at 1259 (majority opinion). 
67. Id.  
68. Id. 
69. Id. 
70. Id. at 384–85, 241 P.3d at 1259–60.  
71. Id. at 387–88, 241 P.3d at 1261. 
72. Id. at 388, 241 P.3d at 1261. 
73. Id. at 388–89, 241 P.3d at 1261.  
74. Id.  
75. Id. at 392, 241 P.3d at 1261–62.  
76. Id. at 394, 241 P.3d at 1264. 
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existed, the court applied ordinary tort principles.
77
 Just as in a traditional 
tort analysis, once the court finds a duty existed outside the contract, the 
plaintiff can recover only if they can establish proximate causation.
78
 
Ultimately, the court held that Eastwood could bring a claim for the tort 
of waste, in addition to her contract claims, against Horse Harbor 
Foundation.
79
 “[T]he duty to not cause waste is a tort duty that arises 
independently of a lease agreement and an aggrieved lessor may pursue 
damages concurrently under theories of tort and breach of lease.”
80
 
Applying the tort theory, the lead opinion concluded there was “ample 
evidence” that Horse Harbor Foundation breached its duty to not cause 
waste and that its conduct was the proximate cause of the damage to the 
property.
81




Justice Madsen’s concurrence agreed in result only. Rather than find 
an independent duty, she argued for an exception to the economic loss rule 
that would prevent its application to bar statutory causes of action, such 
as the tort of waste.
83
 She characterized the newly announced independent 
duty doctrine as “confusing” and asserted that “[t]he lead opinion 
incorrectly states a general rule of law that does not accord with our cases 
on the economic loss rule.”
84
 Justice Madsen’s comments were prescient 
in identifying the incompatibility of the two approaches, particularly the 




The introduction of the independent duty doctrine reshaped the 
landscape established under the economic loss rule.
86
 While not formally 
abrogating the economic loss rule, Eastwood represents a significant shift 
away from the court’s previous deference to contract law.
87
 The parties in 
Eastwood had a lease agreement and the conduct at issue related to Horse 
Harbor Foundation’s obligations under the lease.
88
 However, because the 
court found the tort of waste was a duty that existed independent of the 
agreement, Eastwood was not limited to contract remedies as they likely 
                                                   
77. Id. at 392, 241 P.3d at 1263 
78. Id. at 399, 241 P.3d at 1267. 
79. Id. 
80. Id. 
81. Id. at 400, 241 P.3d at 1267. 
82. Id. at 402, 241 P.3d at 1268. 
83. Id. at 406, 404, 241 P.3d at 1269, 1270 (Madsen, J., concurring). 
84. Id. at 406, 241 P.3d at 1270. 
85. See infra Part II (describing these challenges). 
86. Eastwood, 170 Wash. 2d at 388–89, 241 P.3d at 1261. 
87. Id. at 389, 241 P.3d at 1262. 
88. Id. at 384, 241 P.3d at 1259. 
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would have been under the economic loss rule. Justice Fairhurst’s lead 
opinion and Justices Alexander and Chambers’s concurrence were clear 
that the independent duty doctrine was conceived of as an extension of the 
economic loss rule.
89
 However, their opinions provide no guidance on 
how parties and courts should reconcile the differences between the 
two  rules. 
2. In Affiliated FM Insurance Co. v. LTK Consulting Services, Inc. 
the Washington State Supreme Court Applied the Independent Duty 
Doctrine and Narrowed the Economic Loss Rule 
The same day the court announced the independent duty doctrine in 
Eastwood, it applied the doctrine in Affiliated FM Insurance Co. v. LTK 
Consulting Services, Inc.90 Unfortunately, the court fractured again, 
publishing a 2-4-3 lead opinion, concurrence, and dissent.
91
 Justice 
Fairhurst wrote the lead opinion signed by one other justice.
92
 Despite not 
earning signatures from a majority of the justices, later independent duty 
doctrine cases cite the lead opinion for the critical proposition that the 
independent duty doctrine does not overrule cases decided under the 
economic loss rule.
93
 Justice Chambers authored a concurrence and 
Justice Madsen authored a concurrence and a dissent.
94
 
Affiliated FM was a federal case involving the aftermath of a 2004 
Seattle Monorail fire.
95
 The fire substantially damaged the monorail and 
resulted in the evacuation of 150 passengers.
96
 The City of Seattle had a 
concession agreement with Seattle Monorail Services (SMS), a private 
company, to maintain and run the monorail and a separate contract with 
LTK Consulting Services, Inc. (LTK), another private company, to 
                                                   
89. Id. at 393–94, 241 P.3d at 1264; id. at 406, 241 P.3d at 1270 (Alexander, J. & Chambers, J., 
concurring). 
90. Affiliated FM Ins. Co. v. LTK Consulting Servs., Inc., 170 Wash. 2d 442, 444, 243 P.3d 521, 
523 (2010). 
91. Id. at 461, 463, 476, 243 P.3d at 532, 533, 540; see also Rachael Clark, Comment, Piecing 
Together Precedent: Fragmented Decisions from the Washington State Supreme Court, 94 WASH. L. 
REV. 1989, 2018 (2019) (describing how the Washington State Supreme Court counts votes and 
discussing the specific problem of identifying Affiliated FM’s lead opinion). 
92. Affiliated FM, 170 Wash. 2d at 443, 243 P.3d at 523. 
93. Donatelli v. D.R. Strong Consulting Eng’rs, Inc., 179 Wash. 2d 84, 104, 312 P.3d 620, 630 
(2013) (Madsen, J., dissenting). 
94. Affiliated FM., 170 Wash. 2d at 461, 243 P.3d at 532 (Chambers, J., concurring); id. at 463, 
243 P.3d at 533 (Madsen, C.J., concurring & dissenting). 
95. Affiliated FM, 170 Wash. 2d at 443, 243 P.3d at 523. 
96. Alyssa Burrows, Fire Halts the Seattle Monorail’s “Blue Train” and Passengers are 
Evacuated on May 31, 2004, HISTORYLINK (July 10, 2005), http://www.historylink.org/File/7369 
[https://perma.cc/37BM-4XRV]. 
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 Adding yet another layer, SMS had purchased fire 
insurance through Affiliated FM Insurance Company (AFM Insurance).
98
 
Ultimately, AFM Insurance sued LTK for negligence in its repair work, 
even though SMS and LTK were not in privity of contract because LTK 
was a contractor of the monorail operator, SMS.
99
 The litigation 




A federal district court applied the economic loss rule finding that 
because SMS’s losses were “purely economic,” LTK was not liable in tort 
to SMS; therefore, the district court granted LTK summary judgment.
101
 
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit certified the following question to the 
Washington State Supreme Court: “May party A . . . who has a 
contractual right to operate commercially and extensively on property 
owned by non-party B . . . sue party C . . . in tort for damage to that 
property, when A . . . and C . . . are not in privity of contract[?]”
102
 
Writing the lead opinion, Justice Fairhurst used this opportunity to apply 
the independent duty doctrine announced in Eastwood.103 
To apply the independent duty doctrine, the court first had to determine 
if a duty was owed.
104
 Oddly, in this case, the question was not whether a 
duty was owed independent of the contract, because the parties did not 
have a contract.
105
 The lead opinion separated the tort “duty question” into 
three inquires: “Does an obligation exist? What is the measure of care 




In considering whether a duty was owed, the opinion also considered 
the interests at hand in each remedy.
107
 A contract remedy, or lack thereof 
in this case, would maintain the parties’ expectation interests; and a tort 
remedy would serve the policy interest of safety of persons and property 
from physical injury.
108
 The lead opinion recognized that each remedy 
drives different incentives, noting that “[t]ort liability would force 
negligent engineers to internalize the costs of their unreasonable conduct, 
                                                   
97. Affiliated FM, 170 Wash. 2d at 445, 243 P.3d at 523–24. 
98. Id. at 445, 243 P.3d at 524. 
99. Id. at 445, 243 P.3d at 523–24. 
100. Id. at 446, 243 P.3d at 524. 
101. Id. at 446–47, 243 P.3d at 524.  
102. See McDonnell, supra note 18, at 650 (citing Affiliated FM, 170 Wash. 2d at 447, 243 P.3d at 525). 
103. Affiliated FM, 170 Wash. 2d at 442, 243 P.3d at 523. 
104. Id. at 449, 243 P.3d at 526. 
105. Id. at 444–46, 243 P.3d at 523–24 (describing the facts). 
106. Id. at 449, 243 P.3d at 526.  
107. Id. at 452, 243 P.3d at 527–28. 
108. Id.  
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making them more likely to take due care.”
109
 Justice Fairhurst also 
acknowledged that the recognition of a duty in the case of economic harm 
increases liability and costs overall, but concluded that considerations of 
public safety outweighed those risks.
110
 Ultimately, the lead opinion found 
that LTK owed a duty of care independent of its contract with the City of 
Seattle and permitted AFM Insurance to sue for negligence.
111
 
Justice Fairhurst also clarified that the newly restyled independent duty 
doctrine did not overrule cases determined under the economic loss 
rule.
112
 Despite earning the majority in result only, future independent 
duty doctrine cases cite to this proposition in the lead opinion as 
decided.
113
 Thus, the lead opinion’s preservation of economic loss rule 
cases has been incorporated into the doctrine and has contributed to the 
on-going struggle over how to define it. 
The concurrence, authored by Justice Chambers and earning three 
additional votes, agreed in result only.
114
 He argued that the case should 
be treated “like an ordinary tort case” that did not implicate the 
independent duty doctrine and found it well-established in existing tort 
law that professionals owe a duty to exercise the degree of care established 
as reasonable in their professional community.
115
 
The dissent, authored by Justice Madsen, essentially agreed with the 
concurrence that the case should have been resolved in tort alone, and 
found that, because there was no contract between the parties, the 
economic loss rule did not apply.
116
 Still, the dissent took the opportunity 
to strongly reject the independent duty doctrine analysis and relied on 
economic loss rule principles in its reasoning, ignoring the court’s 
decision in Eastwood.117 
The court’s split decision illustrates the tension that immediately 
surrounded the independent duty doctrine in Washington State. Rather 
than provide a clear example, Affiliated FM exposed divisions within the 
court over issues such as when the doctrine applies and how to define its 
relationship to tort law. The lead opinion’s finding that the economic loss 
rule cases are still good law under the independent duty doctrine 
exacerbated these tensions. 
                                                   
109. Id. at 453, 243 P.3d at 528. 
110. Id. 
111. Id. at 460–61, 243 P.3d at 532. 
112. Id. at 450, 243 P.3d at 526 n.3.  
113. Donatelli v. D.R. Strong Consulting Eng’rs, Inc., 179 Wash. 2d 84, 104, 312 P.3d 620, 630 
(2013) (Madsen, J., dissenting). 
114. Affiliated FM., 170 Wash. 2d at 461–62, 243 P.3d at 532 (Chambers, J., concurring). 
115. Id.  
116. Id. at 476, 243 P.3d at 539 (Madsen, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
117. Id. at 464–69, 243 P.3d at 533–35 (Madsen, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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II. THE WASHINGTON STATE SUPREME COURT’S 
RECOGNITION OF THE TORT OF NEGLIGENT 
MISREPRESENTATION UNDER THE INDEPENDENT DUTY 
DOCTRINE DEMONSTRATES ITS INCOMPATIBILITY WITH 
THE ECONOMIC LOSS RULE 
Despite the Washington State Supreme Court’s direction that the 
independent duty doctrine is simply an extension of the economic loss 
rule, in practice, the rules demonstrate marked differences. This is 
especially true when the court has grappled with whether to recognize tort 
claims that were barred under the economic loss rule. 
The independent duty doctrine changed the court’s framework for 
recognizing new tort claims.
118
 The economic loss rule recognized tort 
claims in only a limited set of circumstances.
119
 Conversely, the 
independent duty doctrine starts with the assumption that tort claims are 
valid and only limits them in a narrow set of circumstances.
120
 In Elcon 
Construction, Inc. v. Eastern Washington University,121 the court held that 
the independent duty doctrine would apply to prevent tort claims in only 
a “narrow” class of cases––specifically, claims arising out of construction 
and real estate.
122
 The court based its limitation on Eastwood’s direction 
“not to apply the doctrine to tort remedies ‘unless and until this court has, 




The court’s treatment of the tort of negligent misrepresentation under 
the independent duty doctrine is one example of how the doctrine differs 
from the economic loss rule. Historically, many states have struggled with 
how the economic loss rule applies to claims of fraud such as negligent 
misrepresentation.
124
 This section illustrates these differences and 
struggles in Washington State by describing how the court treated the tort 
of negligent misrepresentation under the economic loss rule and its current 
treatment under the independent duty doctrine. 
                                                   
118. Donatelli, 179 Wash. 2d at 105, 312 P.3d at 632 (Madsen, J., dissenting). 
119. Alejandre v. Bull, 159 Wash. 2d 674, 683–84, 153 P.3d 864, 868 (2007). 
120. Eastwood v. Horse Harbor Found., Inc., 170 Wash. 2d 380, 387, 241 P.3d 1256, 1261 (2010); 
Terence Scanlan, A View Five Years from Eastwood and Affiliated FM: Washington’s Transition 
from Economic Loss Doctrine to Independent Duty Doctrine, SKELLENGER BENDER, P.S. (Nov. 10, 
2015), http://www.skellengerbender.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/2015-11-10-WA_s-
Transition-from-ELD-to-Independent-Duty-Doctrine.pdf [https://perma.cc/JXM5-YGPQ]. 
121. 174 Wash. 2d 157, 273 P.3d 965 (2012). 
122. Id. at 165, 273 P.3d at 969. 
123. Id. at 165, 273 P.3d at 970 (quoting Eastwood, 170 Wash. 2d at 417, 241 P.3d at 1256).  
124. See Barton, supra note 6, at 1790 (discussing the history of various states’ treatment of claims 
arising out of a defendant’s fraudulent conduct under the economic loss rule). 
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Washington recognizes the tort of negligent misrepresentation and 
largely follows the elements identified in the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts § 552(1) approach.125 Under this rule, liability for negligent 
misrepresentation extends only to defendants who are “manifestly aware” 
of how the information they supplied will be used.
126
 Whether the 
defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff to not misrepresent information is 
a question of law.
127
 
Prior to the introduction of the independent duty doctrine, the economic 
loss rule typically prevented negligent misrepresentation claims where the 
parties had a contract.
128
 For example, in Berschauer/Phillips 
Construction Co. v. Seattle School District No. 1,129 the Washington State 
Supreme Court applied the economic loss rule and barred a general 
contractor from asserting a negligent misrepresentation claim against 
design professionals.
130
 The court’s reasoning focused on the “beneficial 
effect to society when contractual agreements are enforced and 
expectancy interests are not frustrated.”
131
 Similarly, in Alejandre v. 
Bull,132 the buyer and seller had a contract limiting liability and 
disclaiming risk.
133
 Under the agreement, new home buyers were barred 
from asserting a negligent misrepresentation claim against the seller.
134
 In 
this case, the court expressed both a willingness to apply the economic 
loss rule to bar negligent misrepresentation claims against sophisticated 
and unsophisticated parties where a contract existed, while 




After the independent duty doctrine replaced the economic loss rule, 
the Washington State Supreme Court shifted its treatment of negligent 
                                                   
125. Donatelli v. D.R. Strong Consulting Eng’rs, Inc., 179 Wash. 2d 84, 95, 312 P.3d 620, 625 
(2013); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1977). 
126. 16A DAVID K. WOLF & KELLER W. ALLEN, WASHINGTON PRACTICE SERIES: TORT LAW & 
PRACTICE § 19:12 (4th ed. 2019) (Negligent Misrepresentation). 
127. Id. 
128. Id.; see also Alejandre v. Bull, 159 Wash. 2d 674, 153 P.3d 864 (2007) (holding the economic 
loss rule barred plaintiff’s negligent misrepresentation claim); Griffith v. Centex Real Estate Corp., 
93 Wash. App. 202, 969 P.2d 486 (1998), as amended on denial of recons. (Dec. 14, 1998) (holding 
the economic loss rule barred plaintiff’s negligent misrepresentation claim).  
129. 124 Wash. 2d 816, 881 P.2d 986 (1994). 
130. Id. at 833, 881 P.2d at 996. 
131. Id. at 828, 881 P.2d at 993. 
132. 159 Wash. 2d 674, 153 P.3d 864 (2007). 
133. Id. at 678, 153 P.3d at 866. 
134. Id. at 682, 153 P.3d at 865. 
135. See id. at 689, 153 P.3d at 871 (“If there is significant disparity in bargaining power, likely 
accompanied by some other contractual infirmity, then there may be an issue as to enforceability of 
the contract—a different question from whether tort remedies should be available.”). 
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 In Donatelli v. D.R. Strong Consulting 
Engineers, Inc.,137 a narrow majority of the court led by Justice Fairhurst 
found that “a negligent misrepresentation claim might exist ‘to the extent 
the duty to not commit negligent misrepresentation is independent of the 
contract.’”
138
 This case was decided in 2013, three years after the court 
adopted the independent duty doctrine and declared that economic loss 
rule cases still applied.
139
 Donatelli, described below, represents a major 
departure from economic loss rule cases, which had barred negligent 
misrepresentation claims in similar contexts.
140
 
A. The Donatelli Majority: The Evolving Independent Duty Doctrine 
and Its Relationship to the Tort of Negligent Misrepresentation 
In Donatelli, the Washington State Supreme Court directly addressed 
a negligent misrepresentation claim under the independent duty 
doctrine.
141
 The Donatellis owned property in King County and hired D.R. 
Strong as their engineer to develop the property.
142
 The parties signed a 
written contract that outlined D.R. Strong’s primary duties and limited 
D.R. Strong’s professional liability to $2,500 or the amount of 
professional fees charged to the Donatellis.
143
 
D.R. Strong procured preliminary approval for the project with King 
County but failed to obtain final approval.
144
 Thus, the sixty-day 
preliminary approval expired before the project was complete.
145
 The 
Donatellis lost the property in foreclosure before D.R. Strong could obtain 
new approvals from the county.
146
 
The Donatellis sued D.R. Strong for breach of contract, professional 
negligence, negligent misrepresentation, and violations of Washington’s 
Consumer Protection Act.
147
 They claimed damages in excess of $1.5 
million.
148
 D.R. Strong moved for partial summary judgment arguing that 
Washington’s economic loss rule barred the Donatellis’ negligence and 
                                                   
136. See Donatelli v. D.R. Strong Consulting Eng’rs, Inc., 179 Wash. 2d 84, 95, 312 P.3d 620, 625 (2013).  
137. 179 Wash. 2d 84, 312 P.3d 620 (2013). 
138. Id. at 96, 312 P.3d at 626. 
139. Id. 
140. See id. at 88, 312 P.3d at 622 (discussing the parties’ written contract).  
141. Id. at 90, 312 P.3d at 623. 
142. Id. at 87, 312 P.3d at 621. 
143. Id. at 88, 312 P.3d at 622; id. at 108, 312 P.3d at 631 (Madsen, J., dissenting). 
144. Id. at 88, 312 P.3d at 622 (majority opinion). 
145. Id. 
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negligent misrepresentation claims because the claims arose out of the 
contract and could be classified as economic losses.
149
 The trial court and 
court of appeals denied the motion, holding that “the independent duty 
doctrine did not bar the Donatellis from bringing negligence claims 
against D.R. Strong because professional engineers owe duties to their 
client independent of any contractual relationship.”
150
 A narrow majority 
of the Washington State Supreme Court affirmed.
151
 Justice Fairhurst 
authored the majority opinion joined by four other justices.
152
 
In discussing the negligence claim, Justice Fairhurst laid out a critical 
requirement of the independent duty doctrine analysis asserting that “[t]he 
analytical framework provided by the independent duty doctrine is only 
applicable when the terms of the contract are established by the record.”
153
 
The majority considered the record “unclear,” despite a written and signed 
contract between the parties, because the Donatellis alleged D.R. Strong’s 




The majority opinion refused to dismiss the Donatellis’ negligent 
misrepresentation action because she found the Donatellis were 
fraudulently induced to enter into the contract by D.R. Strong’s promises 
of a limited project scope, timeline, and fees.
155
 The court held that “the 
duty to avoid misrepresentations that induce a party to enter into a contract 
arise independently of the contract.”
156
 Because D.R. Strong’s duty to 
avoid negligent misrepresentation arose independent of the contract, the 




This holding rejected the economic loss rule approach, which likely 
would have precluded these tort actions because the causes of action arose 
out of the contract and the Donatellis suffered only economic losses. This 
difference is notable because the previous independent duty doctrine 
opinions were clear that the independent duty doctrine was not a rejection, 
but a renaming, of the economic loss rule and its cases.
158
 
                                                   
149. Id. 
150. Id. at 90, 312 P.3d at 622. 
151. Id. at 98, 312 P.3d at 627. 
152. Id.; id. at 119, 312 P.3d at 637 (Madsen, J., dissenting). 
153. Id. at 92, 312 P.3d at 624 (majority opinion). 
154. Id. at 91, 312 P.3d at 623. 
155. Id. at 94, 312 P.3d at 625.  
156. Id. at 91, 312 P.3d at 623.  
157. Id. 
158. Elcon Constr., Inc. v. E. Wash. Univ., 174 Wash. 2d 157, 165, 273 P.3d 965, 969 (2012); 
Eastwood v. Horse Harbor Found., Inc., 170 Wash. 2d 380, 393–94, 241 P.3d 1256, 1264 (2010). 
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B. The Donatelli Dissent Highlights the Discord Between the 
Independent Duty Doctrine and the Economic Loss Rule, 
Especially the Court’s Recognition of the Tort of Negligent 
Misrepresentation 
Donatelli v. D.R. Strong was a five-four decision.159 The dissenting 
opinion, written by Justice Madsen, echoed previous dissents and 
concurrences she had written since Eastwood v. Horse Harbor 
Foundation.160 The dissent unearthed the substantive and practical 
distinctions between the economic loss rule and the independent duty 
doctrine and argued for a return to the pure economic loss rule.
161
 
First, the dissent asserted that the majority failed to adhere to its prior 
independent duty doctrine decisions, which had committed to applying 
existing economic loss rule jurisprudence.
162
 The dissent argued the facts 
in Donatelli were indistinguishable from a previous case decided under 
the economic loss rule, Berschauer/Phillips, and thus Berschauer/Phillips 
should have controlled the outcome of Donatelli.163 In 
Berschauer/Phillips, the court held that “the economic loss rule does not 
allow a general contractor to recover purely economic damages from a 
design professional in tort.”
164
 Since Donatelli similarly concerned the 
obligations of a design professional to a land owner, and the remedies 
available where a contract exists, the dissent argued the 
Berschauer/Phillips’s holding should apply.165 
Next, Justice Madsen lodged a broader critique of the independent duty 
doctrine and argued for a return to the economic loss rule.
166
 Her 
reasoning echoed the strong contract law-oriented principles that led to 
the economic loss rule’s original development.
167
 She urged that the 
independent duty doctrine improperly preferences tort remedies by 
                                                   
159. Donatelli, 179 Wash. 2d at 98, 312 P.3d at 627 (Justices Owens, González, Stephens, and 
Chambers concurring in the majority opinion authored by Justice Fairhurst; Justice Madsen 
dissenting, joined by Justices Wiggins, Johnson, and Johnson). 
160. See id. at 99, 312 P.3d at 627 (Madsen, J., dissenting); Affiliated FM Ins. Co. v. LTK 
Consulting Servs., Inc., 170 Wash. 2d 442, 463, 243 P.3d 521, 533 (2010) (Madsen, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part); Eastwood v. Horse Harbor Found., Inc., 170 Wash. 2d 380, 402, 241 P.3d 
1256, 1268 (2010) (Madsen, J., concurring). 
161. Donatelli, 179 Wash. 2d at 99–100, 312 P.3d at 627–28. 
162. Id. at 104, 312 P.3d at 630 (Madsen, J., dissenting). 
163. Id. at 102, 312 P.3d at 628–29. 
164. Id.; Berschauer/Phillips Constr. Co. v. Seattle Sch. Dist., 124 Wash. 2d 816, 833, 881 P.2d 
986, 996 (1994). 
165. Donatelli, 179 Wash. 2d at 102, 312 P.3d at 628–29 (Madsen, J., dissenting). 
166. Id. at 105, 312 P.3d at 630. 
167. See supra Part I. 
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starting with the premise, “why not allow tort remedies?”
168
 Instead, 
Justice Madsen argued that, when a contract governs the relationship, the 
more appropriate question should be: “[w]hether the dispute or claim is 
within the scope of the contract and if so why allow any remedies outside 
the contract?”
169
 This inquiry necessarily leads back to the original 




The dissent then analyzed the claims at issue, focusing on the type of 
loss suffered, as one would under the economic loss rule.
171
 She found 
that, even in the complaint, the parties alleged the same facts in their 
breach of contract claim as in their negligence and negligent 
misrepresentation claims.
172
 This drove Justice Madsen to conclude that 
“these causes of action all arise out of the contract and the alleged failure 
to meet contractual obligations. They involve no personal injuries or 
damage to property.”
173
 Consequently, the dissent argued, the remedies 
should be contractual only.
174
 
Finally, the dissent reasoned that the case could have been resolved 
under traditional contract law principles by giving effect to the 
professional limitation of liability in the contract.
175
 She argued that 
regardless of the liability at issue, contract or tort, the damages should be 
covered by the provision.
176
 
Justice Madsen’s dissent illustrates the different conclusions one 
reaches when applying the independent duty doctrine versus the economic 
loss rule and its cases. While the independent duty doctrine permits 
independent and concurrent duties in both contract and tort, thereby 
recognizing the tort of negligent misrepresentation, the economic loss rule 
would have limited the contracting parties to contractual remedies only. 
                                                   
168. Donatelli, 179 Wash. 2d at 105, 312 P.3d at 630 (Madsen, J., dissenting). 
169. Id.  
170. Id. at 105–06, 312 P.3d at 630 (“[T]he economic loss rule, unlike the ‘independent duty 
doctrine’ as explained by the majority, more appropriately focuses on the parties’ contractual 
relationship and asks what is covered by the contract, and treats personal injury and physical harm as 
appropriately remedied in tort.”). 
171. Id. 




176. Id. at 107, 312 P.3d at 631. 
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C. Attorneys Representing Large Commercial Parties Share Justice 
Madsen’s Concerns that the Independent Duty Doctrine is a 
Departure from, Not an Extension of, the Economic Loss Rule 
Justice Madsen is not alone in her critique of the independent duty 
doctrine and advocacy for the former economic loss rule.
177
 Proponents of 
the economic loss rule insist the rule is essential to preserving the role of 
contract in society because it provides a bright line rule that permits 
recovery in tort only when the losses are non-economic.
178
 They argue the 
independent duty doctrine has exposed their commercial clients to 
unpredictable liabilities.
179
 These same critics argue strong contract 
doctrines drive economic growth by guaranteeing commercial parties’ 
greater certainty because contracts allow parties to manage their own 
risk.
180
 This approach is most efficacious in the commercial arena where 
sophisticated parties can fairly negotiate agreements and expect to be held 
to those agreements regardless of the outcome.
181
 
The Donatelli majority and dissenting opinions, and commentators’ 
critiques of the doctrine, illustrate the ongoing tension between the two 
rules. The opposite driving principles and deference to contract law versus 
tort law result in different treatment of torts such as negligent 
misrepresentation. This issue is exacerbated by the court’s decision to 
establish a new doctrine without officially abrogating the previous rule. 
Recognizing the tort of negligent misrepresentation in Donatelli not only 
frustrates contract purists like Justice Madsen, but also fuels confusion as 
lower courts and federal district courts struggle to define the outer limits 
of the new doctrine and its relationship to the economic loss rule.
182
 
                                                   
177. See Paul R. Cressman, Jr., More Confusion Over Independent Duty Doctrine – Washington 
Supreme Court Deeply Divided, AHLERS CRESSMAN & SLEIGHT PLLC (Dec. 12, 2013), 
https://www.acslawyers.com/more-confusion-over-independent-duty-doctrine-washington-supreme-
court-deeply-divided/ [https://perma.cc/U97Z-5XM3]; Brian Esler, Washington Supreme Court 
Announces the Death of Contracts: Donatelli v. D.R. Strong Consulting Eng’rs, Inc., MILLER NASH 
GRAHAM & DUNN LLP (Nov. 18, 2013), http://www.millernash.com/washington-supreme-court-
announces-the-death-of-contracts-donatelli-v-dr-strong-consulting-engineers-inc-11-18-20131/ 
[https://perma.cc/V3FX-XC5R]; Scanlan, supra note 120. 
178. Elcon Constr., Inc. v. E. Wash. Univ., 174 Wash. 2d 157, 175, 273 P.3d 965, 974 (2012) 
(Madsen, J., concurring). 
179. See Esler, supra note 177. 
180. See Donatelli, 179 Wash. 2d at 104, 312 P.3d at 630 (Madsen, J., dissenting); see also id.; 
Cressman, supra note 177; Scanlan, supra note 120. 
181. Barton, supra note 6, at 1789. 
182. See infra Part III.  
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III. THE WASHINGTON STATE SUPREME COURT’S 
MAINTENANCE OF THE ECONOMIC LOSS RULE HAS 
CONFUSED LITIGANTS AND OTHER COURTS APPLYING 
THE INDEPENDENT DUTY DOCTRINE 
The Washington State Supreme Court’s series of fractured opinions 
since the introduction of the independent duty doctrine and its inconsistent 
treatment of economic loss rule jurisprudence has resulted in the 
misapplication of the doctrine by litigants and other courts.
183
 
The first major point of confusion surrounds when the independent 
duty doctrine bars tort remedies. In Elcon Construction, Inc. v. Eastern 
Washington University, the Washington State Supreme Court determined 
that the doctrine applied only “to a narrow class of cases, primarily 
limiting its application to claims arising out of construction on real 
property and real property sales.”
184
 The court was attempting to clarify 
that the independent duty doctrine only bars tort remedies in limited 
areas—construction on real property and real property sales—but 
otherwise allows tort remedies in all other contexts.
185
 Despite this decree, 
litigants have misconstrued the Washington State Supreme Court’s 
directions to stand for the opposite principle. 
Litigants and other courts have incorrectly held or argued that the 
independent duty doctrine bars tort remedies in all contexts except 
construction on real property and real property sales. For example, in 
Reading Hospital v. Anglepoint Group, Inc.,186 a federal district court 
chided Microsoft’s counsel for misreading the doctrine.
187
 “Microsoft 
misreads . . . the independent duty doctrine [as] allow[ing] tort remedies 
stemming from contract disputes only in cases involving construction on 
real property and real property sales.”
188
 It is illuminating that even 
presumably sophisticated counsel was unable to understand and apply the 
basics of Washington’s independent duty doctrine. Unfortunately, courts 
have fallen prey to the same misreading. 
Litigants have also confused the mechanics of the independent duty 
doctrine. Seattle-Tacoma International Taxi Association v. Kochar189 
involved a dispute between an airport taxi association and taxi drivers.
190
 
                                                   
183. Id. 
184. Elcon Constr., Inc. v. E. Wash. Univ., 174 Wash. 2d 157, 165, 273 P.3d 965, 969 (2012). 
185. Id. 
186. No. C15-0251-JCC, 2015 WL 13145347 (W.D. Wash. May 26, 2015). 
187. See id. at *3 n.1. 
188. Id. 
189. No. 70843-1-I, 2014 WL 7340248 (Wash. Ct. App. 2014). 
190. Id. at *1. 
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The association induced the taxi drivers to join its organization and pay 
up to $20,000 in initiation fees by affirmatively representing that the 
association would retain its contract with the airport, which it later lost.
191
 
After the taxi drivers refused to pay the remaining balance of the fees due, 
the association sued the drivers for breach of contract.
192
 The drivers 
counterclaimed for negligent misrepresentation among other causes of 
action.
193
 After losing at the trial court, on appeal counsel for the taxi 
association argued that the independent duty doctrine barred the taxi 
drivers’ negligent misrepresentation claim.
194
 The court ultimately 
dismissed the claim because it did not arise out of “construction on real 
property and real property sales.”
195
 However, the fact that the association 
relied on the independent duty doctrine in the first place, demonstrates the 
perplexing relationship between the independent duty doctrine and the 
economic loss rule. Under the economic loss rule this may have been a 
successful defense for the association. The taxi drivers suffered purely 
economic losses and historically the court applied the economic loss rule 
to bar negligent representation claims.
196
 But what the association missed, 
is that the independent duty doctrine triggers a totally different analysis 
than the economic loss rule. The independent duty doctrine would not 
have barred the taxi drivers claim per se. Rather, it would have triggered 
a separate inquiry and asked whether the taxi association “[had] an 
independent duty to avoid negligent misrepresentation.”
197
 As Donatelli 
demonstrated, this inquiry could have easily led to liability for the 
association based on the negligent misrepresentation claims. 
These missteps likely derive from the different nature of the two rules. 
Generally, when the economic loss rule applies, it bars tort claims; but 
when the independent duty doctrine applies, it permits tort claims by 
finding an independent duty.
198
 Despite these differences, because the 
court conceived the independent duty doctrine as an extension of the 
economic loss rule, it still “bars” claims in the same contexts as the 
economic loss rule. Some litigants and courts have missed this nuance. 
This is likely because the court did not officially reject the economic loss 





195. Id. at *6 (quoting Elcon Constr., Inc. v. E. Wash. Univ., 174 Wash. 2d 157, 165, 273 P.3d 965, 
969 (2012)). 
196. See Alejandre v. Bull, 159 Wash. 2d 674, 689, 153 P.3d 864, 871 (2007) (finding the economic 
loss rule precluded a negligent misrepresentation claim).  
197. Seattle-Tacoma Int’l Taxi Ass’n, 2014 WL 7340248, at *6. 
198. Eastwood v. Horse Harbor Found., Inc., 170 Wash. 2d 380, 416–17, 241 P.3d 1256, 1276 
(2010) (Alexander, J. & Chambers, J., concurring). 
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rule when it adopted the independent duty doctrine. Instead, they merely 
inserted the new term despite the rules’ differences.
199
 
Another area of confusion has been the extent to which cases decided 
under the economic loss rule still apply under the independent duty 
doctrine. In Affiliated FM, the lead opinion stated, “[o]ur decisions in this 
case and in Eastwood leave intact our prior cases where we have held a 
tort remedy is not available in a specific set of circumstances.”
200
 Despite 
this pronouncement, courts diverged in their willingness to follow 
economic loss rule jurisprudence. Courts’ varied treatment of the duties 
owed by design and engineering professionals highlights this challenge. 
For example, in Pacific Boring, Inc. v. Staheli Trenchless Consultants, 
Inc.,201 a federal district court held that a general contractor did not owe a 
professional duty of care to its subcontractor in an engineering context.
202
 
The case concerned unexpected soil conditions at a sewer line project.
203
 
In analyzing the duties owed, the court declined to follow the more recent 
independent duty doctrine case, Affiliated FM, which had carved out a 
source of liability for engineers.
204
 Instead, the court found the facts more 
akin to Berschauer/Phillips, an older economic loss rule case that found 




This is compared to Donatelli v. D.R. Strong and Pointe at Westport 
Harbor Homeowners’ Association v. Engineers Northwest, Inc.,206 both 
of which concerned professional duties owed by engineers.
207
 In these 
cases, the Washington State Supreme Court and the court of appeals of 
Washington, Division Two, explicitly followed Affiliated FM and 
declined to follow Berschauer/Phillips.208 Of course, these cases had 
some factual differences from Pacific Boring, Inc.; but ultimately, they all 
concerned professional duties owed by engineers in the construction 
industry and applied the relevant caselaw differently. 
These examples highlight the unpredictability of the independent duty 
doctrine when considered alongside economic loss rule cases. Each of 
                                                   
199. Id. at 406, 241 P.3d at 1270. 
200. Affiliated FM Ins. Co. v. LTK Consulting Servs., Inc., 170 Wash. 2d 442, 450 n.3, 243 P.3d 
521, 526 (2010). 
201. 138 F. Supp. 3d 1156 (W.D. Wash. 2015), aff’d, 708 F. App’x 324 (9th Cir. 2017). 
202. Id. at 1167. 
203. Id. at 1159. 
204. Id. at 1167. 
205. Id. 
206. 193 Wash. App. 695, 376 P.3d 1158 (2016). 
207. Id. 
208. Pointe at Westport Harbor Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Eng’rs Nw., Inc., 193 Wash. App. 695, 376 
P.3d 1158 (2016); Donatelli v. D.R. Strong Consulting Eng’rs, Inc., 179 Wash. 2d 84, 95, 312 P.3d 
620, 625 (2013). 
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these cases concerned the duties design professionals owed in commercial 
contexts, but had different outcomes based on how the court treated and 
distinguished past cases decided under the economic loss rule versus the 
independent duty doctrine. The result is a hyper-fact-specific inquiry as to 
when design professionals owe duties. This uncertainty prevents the 
development of a cohesive and predictable body of law under the 
new  doctrine. 
The continued application of both the economic loss rule and 
independent duty doctrine affects litigants and other courts. Litigants have 
confused and incorrectly relied on the doctrine. In addition, independent 
duty doctrine cases have diverged in their treatment of economic loss rule 
cases. This pattern risks unfair outcomes for plaintiffs in Washington 
State and adds to an increasingly confusing body of caselaw for other 
courts and litigants to apply. 
IV. WASHINGTON SHOULD CLARIFY THE INDEPENDENT 
DUTY DOCTRINE BY ABROGATING ITS ECONOMIC LOSS 
RULE JURISPRUDENCE 
A contradictory situation has resulted from the Washington State 
Supreme Court’s adoption of the independent duty doctrine and the series 
of divided opinions that have followed. While the court intended to clarify 
the economic loss rule, the effect has been greater confusion. In order for 
the independent duty doctrine to succeed, the court should divorce the 
independent duty doctrine from the economic loss rule and its caselaw. It 
should then revise the independent duty doctrine analysis by clarifying 
under what circumstances a duty can be assumed within a  contract. 
First, the Washington State Supreme Court should deliberately depart 
from the economic loss rule.
209
 The economic loss rule is distinct from the 
independent duty doctrine. Its allegiance to contract law drives different 
outcomes than the independent duty doctrine.
210
 It also partially rests on 
classifications of damages, economic versus noneconomic, that the 
independent duty doctrine rejects.
211
 These differences make economic 
loss rule jurisprudence antagonistic to the independent duty doctrine. 
Additionally, the maintenance of the economic loss rule and the 
independent duty doctrine have befuddled other courts and litigants 
applying the doctrine. This is exacerbated by cases like Donatelli, where 
                                                   
209. This shift is especially important given the Affiliated FM Ins. Co. v. LTK Consulting Services, 
Inc.’s lead opinion’s lack of precedential effect discussed in Part II of this Comment. 
210. See supra Part II (discussing Donatelli and the tort of negligent misrepresentation). 
211. Eastwood v. Horse Harbor Found., Inc., 170 Wash. 2d 380, 388, 241 P.3d 1256, 1261 (2010) 
(discussing the economic loss rule); see also Affiliated FM Ins. Co. v. LTK Consulting Servs, Inc., 
170 Wash. 2d 442, 449, 243 P.3d 521, 536 (2010). 
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the court changed its position on the tort of negligent misrepresentation. 
The result is an even more tortured fact-specific doctrine than the previous 
economic loss rule. The court should clarify the independent duty doctrine 
by officially rejecting the economic loss rule. 
Second, the court should clarify the independent duty doctrine analysis. 
This proposal does not depart from the independent duty doctrine 
described in Eastwood and its progeny.212 Rather, it makes explicit the 
steps already described within those opinions and offers another way to 
frame the independent duty doctrine analysis. 
As it stands, the role of the parties’ existing contract in analyzing what 
remedy applies is unclear under the independent duty doctrine.
213
 If the 
duty exists as a matter of law and the duty is subsumed within the contract, 
then what remedy applies? Will the independent duty doctrine prevent the 
party from accessing tort remedies? The current independent duty 
doctrine answers this question by asking, “whether the injury is 
traceable . . . to a breach of a tort law duty of care arising independently 
of the contract.”
214
 But this framing begs another question, when is a duty 
“independent” of the contract? 
The court’s current independent duty doctrine analysis does not 
establish a clear framework to answer this second question. The 
Washington State Supreme Court should reframe the analysis by leaving 
its substance intact, but also by providing a path to more clearly address 
under what circumstance the court is likely to find an “independent duty” 
and allow tort remedies even if the parties have a contract. 
The independent duty doctrine’s core question and analysis should be 
reframed to ask: under what circumstances can tort duties be assumed in 
a contract? This is a helpful reframing because, where tort duties can 
lawfully be assumed within a contract, only contractual remedies should 
apply.
215
 Using this question, the court’s independent duty doctrine 
analysis can be broken down as follows: (1) Was a duty owed, and was 
the duty breached?; (2) Did the parties have a contract and can the duty 
be assumed within a contract? If a tort duty was owed and breached as a 
matter of law, the injury should be remedied in tort, unless the parties had 
a contract and the duty can be assumed in contract. 
                                                   
212. Jackowski v. Borchelt, 174 Wash. 2d 720, 730–32, 278 P.3d 1100, 1105 (2012); Affiliated 
FM, 170 Wash. 2d at 449, 243 P.3d at 526; Eastwood, 170 Wash. 2d at 393–94, 241 P.3d at 1264. 
213. Affiliated FM, 170 Wash. 2d at 464 n.9, 243 P.3d at 533 (Madsen, C. J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part) (suggesting that under the lead opinion’s description of the independent duty 
doctrine “finding a tort duty is equivalent to finding an ‘independent duty’” which then precludes a 
contractual remedy). 
214. Eastwood, 170 Wash. 2d at 394, 241 P.3d at 1264. 
215. See Donatelli v. D.R. Strong Consulting Eng’rs, Inc., 179 Wash. 2d 84, 116, 312 P.3d 620, 
631 (2013) (Madsen, J., dissenting) (discussing contract law principles).  
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According to the court’s current independent duty doctrine 
jurisprudence, whether a duty can be assumed within a contract, depends 
on the following factors:
216
 (1) does the contract specify the obligations of 
the party, including the specific duty at issue; (2) what is the nature of the 
contract—for example, the court has said more duties may be assumed by 
contract in construction, real property, and real property sales than in other 
contexts;
217
 and finally, (3) do public policy considerations militate in 
favor of allowing parties to contract for a private remedy or is the public 
better served by allowing tort remedies to be available regardless of the 
parties contract?
218
 Answering these questions should determine when the 
court will allow a duty to be assumed by contract even if it also exists as 
a matter of law. 
The court’s fractured opinions, and its volleying between old economic 
loss rule principles and the new concept, have resulted in a messy doctrine 
that is difficult for litigants and lower courts to apply. The Washington 
State Supreme Court should abrogate the economic loss rule and clarify 
the independent duty doctrine by making its analysis, especially with 
respect to the role of the existing contracts, more explicit. This proposed 
reframing of the analysis does not substantively alter the independent duty 
doctrine. Rather, it is one example of how the court could improve the 
doctrine by defining what the independent duty doctrine really means for 
contracting parties and elevating under what circumstances a duty may be 
assumed in a contract or is “independent” of the contract. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The essential aims and theoretical underpinnings of the independent 
duty doctrine and the economic loss rule conflict. The economic loss rule 
“defaults to contract remedies where both are available,” while the 
independent duty doctrine defaults to tort remedies.
219
 It is misleading to 
litigants and lower courts to leave both rules intact and suggest they are 
not in fundamental tension. The Washington State Supreme Court can 
remedy this tension by, first, officially rejecting the economic loss rule 
and its cases. Additionally, the court can improve the independent duty 
doctrine by making its analysis more explicit. The doctrine was born 
amidst a divided court. This has resulted in a series of fractured opinions 
                                                   
216. Notably, these are the same factors to answer whether a duty is “independent,” this Comment 
has just reframed the analysis. See Donatelli, 179 Wash. 2d at 92, 312 P.3d at 624; Eastwood, 170 
Wash. 2d at 393–94, 241 P.3d at 1264. 
217. Donatelli, 179 Wash. 2d at 92, 312 P.3d at 623–24. 
218. Elcon Constr., Inc. v. E. Wash. Univ., 174 Wash. 2d 157, 165, 273 P.3d 965, 969 (2012) 
(citing Eastwood, 170 Wash. 2d at 416, 241 P.3d at 1256 (Chambers, J., concurring)). 
219. Id. at 172, 273 P.3d at 973 (Madsen, J., concurring). 
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that confusingly meander between tort and contract law without 
forwarding a clear analysis to be applied by litigants and other courts. The 
court can preserve the independent duty doctrine and improve its 
usefulness by moving away from the emphasis on “independent duties” 
and reframing the analysis around when a tort duty can be assumed 
by  contract. 
 
